**0. Introduction**

One of the premises of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) is that the universe began to exist. There are two types of defence for this premise; scientific and philosophical. In the latter category, there is one argument in particular that I want to focus on, which Craig calls the ‘argument from the impossibility of an actual infinite’.

The argument runs like this:

- An actual infinite cannot exist
- An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite
- Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist

Craig holds that the past had a beginning, but also that the future has no end (presumably due to his beliefs about the afterlife). This invites the following objection, which has been made in the literature by Wes Morriston (here). We seem to be able to formulate a symmetrical argument which should conclude that the future has an end point:

- An actual infinite cannot exist
- An infinite temporal
*pro*gress of events is an actual infinite - Therefore, an infinite temporal progress of events cannot exist

(The term ‘progress’ is artificial used in this context, but it is clearly intended as the temporal mirror of the term ‘regress’)

The first argument says that the past must have a beginning, otherwise it would constitute an actual infinity. The second argument, the counter-argument, says the future must have an end, otherwise it would constitute an actual infinity.

Morriston has a thought experiment to illustrate his point. He asks us to imagine two angels, Gabriel and Uriel, who take turns saying praises to God forever. He makes the following remarks:

“It’s true, of course, that Gabriel and Uriel will never complete the series of praises. They will never arrive at a time at which they have said all of them. Indeed, they will never arrive at a time at which they have said infinitely many praises. At every stage in the future series of events as I am imagining it, they will have said only finitely many. But that makes not a particle of difference to the point I am about to make. If you ask, “How many distinct praises will be said?” the only sensible answer is, infinitely many.” (Morriston, Beginningless Past, Endless Future, and the Actual Infinite, p. 446)

To counter this, Craig argues that the endless future is best considered a merely *potential* infinity, (in contrast to the beginningless past, which is best considered as an actual infinity). As Craig says in his reply to Morriston, Taking Tense Seriously:

“So with respect to Morriston’s illustration of two angels who begin to praise God forever, an A-theorist will concur whole-heartedly with his statement, “If you ask, ‘How many praises

will besaid?’ the only sensible answer is,infinitely many”— that is to say, potentially infinitely many. If this answer is allowed the A-theorist, then Morriston’s allegedly parallel arguments collapse.”

Effectively, Craig is denying the second premise of our counter-argument. He is saying that an infinite temporal progress of events is not an actual infinity – it is merely a potential infinity.

In what follows I want to look at three types of response to this. This post will constitute the first part, and in subsequent posts I will address the second and third points.

Firstly, I will spell out an intuition that many people have, according to which if there is a potential infinity there must be a corresponding actual infinity. We will call this ‘Cantor’s Intuition’ for reasons we will get into below. If Cantor’s Intuition was correct, then Craig’s response would be defused. For then we could “concur whole-heartedly with his statement” that the future is potentially infinite, and insist that it is *also actually infinite*. According to this line of thinking, the potential and actual infinite are not mutually exclusive.

Secondly, I want to look at a different strategy. Perhaps the future is not actually infinite, and the second premise of the counter-argument is false. But the thought is that maybe this leaves open the door to denying the second premise of the original argument. That is, if the infinite progress of events is a merely potential infinity, maybe the infinite regress of events is a merely potential infinity as well. Craig is very dismissive of this view, but I think it is worth exploring.

Lastly, I want to look at why Craig thinks there is an asymmetry here at all. Here it seems that considerations about the philosophy of mathematics are completely irrelevant, and all that is doing the heavy lifting is considerations about the philosophy of time. Of course, all but the most fanatical would concede that time is in some sense asymmetric. Yet, this can be cashed out in lots of different ways. Do any of those ways of understanding the asymmetry do the work that Craig needs?

**Potential infinite implies actual infinite**

The mathematical study of the infinite was revolutionised in the 19th century by the work of various mathematicians, but the primary figure is clearly Georg Cantor. He was the first to work out the mathematics of the infinite, and in particular gave a formal treatment of the actual infinite. He changed his mind quite a lot, but at one time in particular he held a view that I want to bring up here. In 1886, he wrote a letter to the mathematician Richard Dedekind, in which he made the following comments:

“… since there can be no doubt that we cannot do without the variable magnitudes in the sense of the potential infinite, then the necessity of the actual infinite can be proved as follows: In order for such variable magnitudes to be capable of evaluation in a mathematical investigation, their “range” of evaluation must be precisely known by means of a prior definition. But this “range” cannot itself be in turn something variable, for otherwise every fixed support for the investigation would give way; hence this “range” is a definite actually infinite set of values. Thus, every potential infinite, if it is to be employable in mathematics, presupposes an actual infinity.” (Quoted in ‘The Potential Infinite‘, by W D Hart, 1979)

Cantor’s Intuition seems to be that the following inference is valid:

If x is a potential infinite, then x is an actual infinite.

If Cantor’s Intuition is right, and the above inference is valid, then Craig’s argument does not work. The reason is that Craig is using the terms potential infinity and actual infinity as if they were mutually exclusive; that something can be one or other but not both. Yet, if Cantor is right here, then if something is potentially infinite, it is also actually infinite, and thus they are *not* mutually exclusive after all.

But *is* Cantor right?

**2. A potential infinite that is not an actual infinite**

Well, in some sense it seems that he was wrong. Not *every* potentially infinity presupposes an actual infinity. Consider the hierarchy of sets. So, start with the empty set (the set with *zero* elements):

∅

Then there is the set with *one* element; namely, it has the empty set as it’s sole element:

{∅}

Then there is the set that contains *two* elements: the empty set, and the the set which contains the empty set:

{∅, {∅}}

Clearly, we can go on elaborating this hierarchy forever, just constructing more sets in this way. But does this constitute a completed totality – an actual infinity? There are good reasons for thinking not. Such a proposal seems to require that there is a ‘set of all sets’, and that seems incoherent. The reasoning is as follows. Suppose there was a set, V, which was the set of all sets. Well, why can’t we make another set, which has all the sets which are elements of V, as well as V, as it’s elements? Such a thing seems to be a set, and seems to employ just the process we have used at the lower levels. Yet it contains V, which we just postulated was the set of all sets. And that would mean that V is not the totality of all sets after all, but merely one more level of the hierarchy.

Such considerations seem to suggest that there cannot be a set of all sets, conceived of in this way. And if that is right, then the hierarchy of sets is potentially infinite, in that each set is finite but part of a never-ending hierarchy, where the notion of the completed totality is incoherent. Thus, along this way of thinking, we have an example of a potential infinite which is not an actual infinite. Such is the view of many people, including set theorists such as Ernst Zermelo, Kurt Gödel, and philosophers of mathematics such as Hilary Putnam, Charles Parsons, Geoffrey Hellman, and Oystein Linnebo.

And if this way of thinking is right, then Cantor was wrong here. Not *every* potential infinity implies an actual infinity.

**3. A potential infinity that is also an actual infinity**

Yet, things are not quite so straightforward. Although not every instance of a potential infinity presupposes an actual infinity; still, *some* might do. The hierarchy of sets is a particularly striking example where the idea of the completed infinity seems incoherent (for the reasons given above). However, the same sorts of considerations are not present in other cases.

For example, take the natural numbers. One can easily, and quite without contradiction, talk about the set of ‘*all* natural numbers’. This notion does not fall prey to the same worries as the set of all sets. Part of the achievement of Cantor was to elaborate the mathematical treatment of totalities such as the natural numbers. It is true that one could imagine counting forever, and such a process would increase without limit, always remaining finite and never being completed. Thus, it would be a potential infinity.

However, we can say things like “You will never have counted *all the natural numbers*” and when we use the phrase ‘all the natural numbers’ so we refer to a coherent concept. Even if we cannot reach the totality by counting, the concept of the totality itself does not seem incoherent in the same way as it does for the hierarchy of sets.

So in the case of the natural numbers, we have a potential infinity (instantiated by you trying to count them all), but we also have a completed infinity, which is the totality of numbers you are counting. And this is Cantor’s point. You can have a ‘variable magnitude’, which is the number you have counted (which is increasing over time), and there is the ‘range’ of numbers you are counting off, which does not increase and is an actual infinity. Thus, it seems like a potential infinity which presupposes an actual infinity.

Some people do disagree with this, of course. But such people are not merely saying that the concept of the actual infinity cannot be applied in the ‘real world’, as opposed to the mathematical world. Rather, such opposition requires disagreeing with Cantor that the actual infinity is a legitimate concept *even in the mathematical realm*. Carl Friedrich Gauss, for instance, strongly objected to the actual infinite even in mathematics. Such a position is called ‘finitism‘.

Craig, on the other hand, seems to have no principled objection to Cantorian treatments of the actual infinite in mathematics; he does not seem to be a finitist. If so, he should accept that sometimes there are potential infinities that are also actual infinities, such as the natural numbers.

**4. Conclusion**

Where does this leave us? I think we can say two things. Firstly, the following inference is invalid:

*If x is a potential infinity, then x is an actual infinity.*

It is invalid because the hierarchy of sets seems to be a plausible counterexample. However, unless one wants to take a very stern Gaussian position and banish the actual infinite even from mathematics, one must also concede that the following inference is also invalid:

*If x is a potential infinity, then x is not an actual infinity*

This seems invalid because the coherence of the totality of the natural numbers seems to be a counterexample.

This means that one cannot say that the angels prayers constitute an actual infinity merely because they constitute a potential infinity; but also one cannot say that they do *not* constitute an actual infinity merely because they constitute a potential infinity. Both sides can agree that they constitute a potential infinity, and this leaves open the question about whether they also constitute an actual infinity. In effect, the observation that they constitute a potential infinity is besides the point. The salient issue is about whether they constitute an actual infinity, and that is logically independent (assuming both of the above inferences are indeed invalid).

I think the lesson from this is that some potential infinities are also actual infinities, and some are not. The question becomes: which type is the future? The case we saw where something was potentially infinite but not actually infinite involved an incoherence involved in the notion of the totality. Is such a consideration present when it comes to the notion of the future?

One thing that seems plausibly problematic is the notion of the *last time*. One might think that the very notion of ‘a time’ implies that it has a past and a future. Such seemed to be Aristotle’s view:

“Now since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the moment, and the moment a kind of middle-point, uniting as it does in itself both a beginning and an end, a beginning of future time and an end of past time, it follows that there must always be time: for the extremity of the last period of time that we take must be found in some moment, since time contains no point of contact for us except the moment. Therefore, since the moment is both a beginning and an end, there must always be time on both sides of it.” (

Physics, book 6, part 1)

But such considerations shouldn’t sway us here. After all, the notion of number is similar in this respect. Just as we might think that for each moment of time there must be both past and future on either side of it, so too for each number there must be both higher and lower numbers on either side of it. The point is that we can conceive of the totality of natural numbers without thinking of there being a highest natural number. So, by analogy, even if there is no final time, this does itself stop us from conceiving of the totality of all future time.

We would be able to say that the future is potential and not actually infinite if there were some incoherence involved in thinking of the totality of future time, like there was with the totality of the hierarchy of sets. Yet, the cases seem dissimilar here. After all, what was causing the problem with the case of the sets was that the totality was itself a set. This meant that it could be fed into the iterative process that generated each preceding level in the hierarchy, generating a new level above it.

But such a move is not applicable to the notion of time. After all, the totality of time is not itself a time. Therefore, we need not suppose that *the totality of time* is itself followed by another time. If we did, then the case would be analogous to the set example. But it seems clearly to be distinct.

This does not establish that the case of time definitely is one that is both potentially infinite and actually infinite, but it does seem to show that if there is a reason it is not directly analogous to the hierarchy of sets example. Maybe there is an argument, but what is it?

My thought is that the time example is more like the natural numbers than the sets. Talk of the totality seems coherent. Thus, it seems entirely possible, at least conceptually, that the future is both a potential infinity and an actual infinity. And if that is right, then Craig’s reply is kind of impotent. Yes, potentially infinitely many praises will be said. But also, there is an actual infinity of praises yet to be said. The former point does not itself rule out, or in, the latter. Clearly, more needs to be said (though, hopefully not infinitely more).